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SHUT UP AND VOTE: A CRITIQUE OF
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
AND THE LIFE OF TALK
JAMES A. GARDNER*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last few years, the subject of "discourse" has received enormous
attention in the legal academy. It is virtually impossible to open a legal
journal without coming across articles devoted to the dynamics of legal and
political discourse, the power relations among the participants, or the
significance of the dialogic process. Much of this work has been devoted
to establishing the desirability-and in some cases the ethical necessity-of
social dialogue, especially patient and respectful listening.' However, until
recently, few serious attempts had been made to fold the insights of dialogic
theory into any kind of political theory that might provide concrete guidance
to real people about how they ought to live their lives.2
* ProfessorofLaw, Western New England College School of Law; B.A. 1980, Yale
University; J.D. 1984 University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Neal Devins, Lise
Gelernter, Eric Gouvin, Don Korobkin and Sam Stonefield for helpful comments and
suggestions. I am especially grateful to Jay Mootz for his meticulous criticism and for his
patience over the course of many discussions that greatly helped me clarify my thinking. An
earlier version of this Article was presented at a faculty colloquium at the College of William
& Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law. My thanks to the participants.
1. Much of this work has occurred in the areas of civic republicanism,
communitarianism, and narrative theory. Representative works in each of these categories
include, respectively: Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: TracesofSelf-Government, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 4 (1986) [hereinafter Michelman, Traces]; Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative,97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); and Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists
and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989).
2. In this regard, Jirgen Habermas, one of the most important figures in the
blossoming of interest in discourse, has warned against the possibility of using his theory of
discourse ethics as a ways of justifying a theory of politics. Jirgen Habermas, Discourse
Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification, in THE COMMUNICATIVE ETHICS
CONTROVERSY 60, 83 (Seyla Benhabib & Fred Dallmayr eds., 1990); see also Seyla
Benhabib, Liberal Dialogue Versus a Critical Theory of Discursive Legitimation, in
LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 143, 149-50, 154 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989).
Recently, however, Habermas seems to be making steps in this direction himself. See
JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (1995); Julrgen Habermas, Human Rights
and Popular Sovereignty: The Liberal and Republican Versions, 7 RATIO JURIs 1, 12-13
(1994). For further reviews, see James Bohman, Complexity, Pluralism, and the Constitution-
al State: On Habermas's Faktizitat und Geltung, 28 L. & SOC'Y REV. 897 (1994); Michel
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A number of legal and political theorists have now begun to fill this gap
by developing a political theory of "deliberative democracy."3 Motivated
by serious concern over the steady erosion in the quality of American
political discourse, and inspired by a combination of communitarian, civic
republican, and discourse-ethics principles, proponents of deliberative
democracy have built a political theory around the premise that substantial,
open, ethical dialogue is a critical, and indeed defining, feature of a good
polity. As its name suggests, deliberative democracy both recommends and
attempts to justify a political life devoted centrally to talk.
While the deliberative democracy project is attractive and well-
motivated, I shall argue in this Article that it is largely a failure, whether
viewed in instrumental or normative terms. From an instrumental perspec-
tive, deliberative democracy is no better suited than other forms of
democracy to deliver whatever benefits a life of dialogue might confer on
citizens or society, and in some cases deliberative democracy would be
substantially worse than some of its competitors. Normatively, both the
kind of life recommended by deliberative democracy and its corresponding
conception of the good citizen turn out to be highly unattractive; a
deliberative democracy is quite simply not a place that most people would
want to live.
The Article is organized as follows. Part II introduces the problems of
American political life to which deliberative democracy purports to respond,
and then describes deliberative democracy's four main features: dialogue,
diversity, openness, and consensus. Proponents of deliberative democracy
contend that it merits our attention because it is historically grounded in the
thought of the framers of the Constitution, and because it is an independent-
ly attractive political theory with favorable constitutional ramifications. Part
III examines the historical claim to constitutional status, and concludes that
it is unfounded.
Rosenfeld, Law as Discourse: Bridging the Gap Between Democracyand Rights, 108 HARV.
L. REv. 1163 (1995).
3. Theorists who actually use the term "deliberative democracy" include: CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITU-
TION]; Joseph M. Bessette, Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican
Government, in How DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTITUTION? (Robert A. Goldwin & William
A. Schambra eds., 1980); Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in THE
GOOD POLITY: NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STATE 17 (Alan Hamlin & Philip Pettit eds.,
1989); David M. Estlund, Who's Afraid of Deliberative Democracy? On the Strate-
gic/DeliberativeDichotomy in Recent Constitutional Jurisprudence, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1437
(1993); Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Republican-OrientedLegal Theory and
the Moral Foundation of Deliberative Democracy, 82 CAL. L. REv. 329 (1994); Amy
Gutmann, The Disharmony of Democracy, in DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY: NOMOS XXXV
(John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro eds., 1993) [hereinafter Gutmann, Disharmony]. For other
authors relying on substantially similar analytic concepts, even if their terminology differs,
see sources cited infra, part 1.B.
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Parts IV and V take up deliberative democracy's merits as a political
theory. Dialogue is at the heart of deliberative democracy. Part IV
examines the instrumental benefits that deliberative democracy might confer
by requiring citizens to engage in more and better dialogue, and concludes
that it either cannot deliver such benefits, or does so no better than its
competitors. Part IV additionally suggests that deliberative democracy may
usefully be viewed less as a prescription for improving the quality of
American political life than as a justification for a radical and obstructionist
form of protection of political minorities.
Part V examines the normative claim that a life lived under deliberative
democracy is a good life and that in consequence deliberative democracy
can be expected to constitute citizens who possess the character and exercise
the virtues of the good democratic citizen. I argue that the ultimate though
unintended result of deliberative democracy is to constitute citizens who are
likely to be ineffectual, tyrannical and obstructionist-precisely the opposite
of what deliberative democracy's supporters hope to achieve. Finally; Part
V concludes with a brief sketch of what I call the "Madisonian citizen," a
citizen far better suited to life in a modem republic characterized by the
Madisonian conditions of large territory and population, a heterogeneous
citizenry, and indirect democracy under a regime of popular elections.
II. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
A. The Problem of American Politics: A Brief History
Criticism of the debased state of American politics has become almost
a part of American politics. Political scientists have long documented, and
political theorists have long decried, the superficiality of American electoral
politics as well as the apathy, alienation, and lethargy of the American
electorate.4 One relatively common diagnosis of what ails our society is
that it is insufficiently democratic. Under this view, the primary culprit is
our system of indirect democracy, in which public questions are decided by
distant legislators and citizens are confined to the occasional choice of
government officials.5
4. Two classic voting studies by political scientists are BERNARD R. BERELSON ET
AL., VOTING (1954) and ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER (1960). The
many theoretical critics include HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION (1965); BENJAMIN R.
BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY 173 (1984); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM
AND DEMOCRACY (1950); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, I DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 90, 97
(1835) (Vintage 1945) (criticizing central government for sapping the spirit of citizenship).
For sympathetic explanations of political apathy from two very different perspectives, see
ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 265-70, 274 (1957); JUDITH N.
SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 15-16, 26-27 (1991).
5. See, e.g., ARENDT, supra note 4; PETER BACHRACH, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRAT-
1996]
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If this is the problem, then more democracy certainly seems to be the
cure. One difficulty with this analysis is that American society has become
continuously more democratic ever since the founding. The collapse of the
electoral college into a form of popular presidential election 6; the constitu-
tional switch from state legislative appointment of Senators to popular
election;7 the broadening of the franchise'; the introduction of initiatives
and referenda on the state and local levels'; and the provision for electoral
control over proliferating special governmental districts"° are among the
more visible formal changes injecting greater democracy into the
Madisonian system. Of perhaps even greater importance is the recent
introduction of what seems like an informal system of governance by public
opinion poll, in which politicians do virtually nothing that their constituents
have not approved in the latest commissioned survey." Although it is
hardly clear that these changes have actually caused an erosion in the
quality of American politics, they seem certainly to have accompanied such
a decline without stemming it.
Some critics have responded to this situation by denying the existence
of a problem. Public choice theorists, for example, have taken this tack by
arguing that political apathy merely reflects a rational, utility-maximizing
strategy of free individuals," and that the apparent superficiality of
political discourse shows only that politics is nothing more than a competi-
tive struggle for control over social resources. 3 Needless to say, some
democracy theorists who are concerned about the state of American politics
IC ELITISM (1967); BARBER, supra note 4; ROBERT A. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION? (rev.
ed. 1990); C.B. MACPHERSON, DEMOCRATIC THEORY: ESSAYS IN RETRIEVAL (1973); JANE
J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY (1980); CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPA-
TION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1970); THE CASE FOR PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 3-6
(C. George Benello & Dimitrios Roussopoulos eds., 1971) [hereinafter PARTICIPATORY
DEMOCRACY]. For critiques of participatory democracy, see ALFRED DE GRAZIA, PUBLIC
AND REPUBLIC (1951); M.B.E. Smith, The Value of Participation, in PARTICIPATION IN
POLITICS: NOMOS XVI (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1975).
6. See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214(1952); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1(1892).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
8. Id. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
9. See, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELKER, ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN
A FEDERAL SYSTEM 761-62 (1990).
10. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part l-Localism and Legal Theory,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 377 (1990).
See Robert Wright, Hyperdemocracy!, TIME, Jan. 13 1995, at 5
12. See DOWNS, supra note 4.
13. This view is typically traced to Joseph Schumpeter, SCHUMPETER, supra note 4.
For more recent examples, see JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS
OF CONSENT (1965); ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956);
DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION (1991).
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have been horrified by public choice theory's celebration of the very aspects
of democratic politics that they find most distasteful.14 The problem, they
say, is not so much the lack of democracy, as the lack of democracy of the
right kind, under the right conditions-the lack, that is to say, of meaningful
democracy. It follows that the challenge facing political theory is to
investigate ways in which democratic politics can deliver more fully the
benefits it is generally thought to confer.
American thinking about democracy has long been dominated by two
competing political theories sometimes known, in C.B. Macpherson's
terminology, as "protective democracy" and "developmental democracy."' 5
Protective democracy is the theory of democracy most closely associated
with liberalism, and with liberal thinkers such as Locke, Montesquieu and
Madison. It holds that the ultimate justification for democracy lies in
democracy's unique capacity to protect private citizens from government
tyranny. 16 This protection is typically accomplished through the use of
such devices as frequent elections; the division of governmental power; and
the constitutional and legal protection of individual rights and liberties. The
ultimate purpose of this security is to enable citizens freely to pursue their
private ends.
Theories of developmental democracy, in contrast, hold that democracy
is justified primarily by its effect on the citizenry. Active participation
in a democratic polity creates informed, politically aware, and public-spirited
citizens who, as a result of participating jointly in the public enterprise of
collective self-government, enjoy meaningful membership in a genuine
community. In some accounts, democratic citizenship is understood as the
ultimate fulfillment of human life, and thus an end in itself. This view has
its roots in Aristotelian notions of the political nature of human beings, 8
14. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Republican Revival]; Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracv
in American ConstitutionalArgument: The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L.
REV. 291 (1989) [hereinafter Michelman, Pornography Regulation].
15. C.B. MACPHERSON, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1977)
[hereinafter MACPHERSON, LIFE AND TIMES]. Although the terminology is Macpherson's,
his definitions of the terms are not very useful for my purposes because of his idiosyncratic
notion of liberal democracy and because of the strong Marxist streak running through his
work, id. at 10. Instead, I shall follow more closely the usage suggested by David Held,
which traces these concepts to their origins in a more conventional way. See DAVID HELD,
MODELS OF DEMOCRACY (1987).
16. HELD, supra note 15, at 51-55.
17. MACPHERSON, LIFE AND TIMES, supra note 15, at 47-48, 51-52; HELD, supra note
15, at 72, 80, 86-89.
18. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS I.ii, § 9, at 5 (1253a) (Ernest Barker ed. & trans.,
1978).
1996] 425
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and probably found its most influential modem expression in the writings
of John Stuart Mill. 9
Viewed through this conceptual frame, the problem with American
democracy-what makes it less than fully meaningful-seems to be its lack
of an effective developmental component. This belief gave rise, particularly
in the 1970s, to widespread calls for "participatory democracy.' 20
Advocates of participatory democracy contend that the machinery of
government must be radically opened to popular participation and control,
primarily by distributing meaningful power downward toward decentralized
local bodies small enough to allow individual citizens to experience self-
governance in an authentic way.2 Participatory democracy is, in other
words, a form of direct democracy.
At this point, however, the prescription of greater developmental
democracy for the ailments of American politics runs head-on into what is
almost certainly the only other American social problem of comparable
magnitude and concern: the treatment of minorities.22 The difficulty is
this: direct democracy tends to be distinctly inhospitable to the claims of
minorities. Madison himself disparaged direct democracy on the ground that
it was unstable because it gives vent to the passions that occasionally sweep
democratic majorities; Madison went so far as to identify "majority faction,"
or the rule of the majority in its own self-interest, as the single most
important danger which a constitution can guard against.23
This makes the problem of American politics far more complex:
improving politics requires giving citizens a more meaningful form of
19. JOHN S. MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, in ON
LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS (1991). Although developmental democracy and protective
democracy differ in their emphases on the public and private lives, respectively, of citizens,
the two can be roughly reconciled if democracy is understood to be the only form of
government capable of creating the kind of citizens who have the capacity to discern, and to
use the power of government to protect, their individual and collective interests. This was
essentially Mill's position. See id. at 254 (government by one or the few cultivates passivity
in the populace).
20. See PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS: NoMos XVI (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1975); PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY, supra note 5; PATEMAN, supra note 5.
Sympathetic accounts can be found in BARBER, supra note 4; MANSBRIDGE, supra note 5;
and Paul Brest, Further Beyond the Republican Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism, 97
YALE L.J. 1623 (1988).
21. See, e.g., BARBER, supra note 4; DAHL, supra note 5.
22. The term "minorities" should be understood throughout to refer to political
minorities rather than racial or ethnic minorities. Of course, a racial or ethnic minority may
also be a political minority, but my analysis does not focus specifically on the problems of
racial or ethnic minorities as such.
23. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). The suspicion of democracy of course
goes back as far as the ancient Greeks, who defined it as the rule of the poor. See
MACPHERSON, LIFE AND TIMES supra note 15, at 9-10.
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democratic experience, but doing so puts at risk the rights and liberties of
minorities. Madison, of course, saw this tension clearly and opted for
liberty over democracy, for protection over development. But is the choice
really as stark as that? Must we make do with one or the other, or might
there be some form of democracy that offers citizens a meaningful life of
genuine participation in self-governance while still protecting the basic
liberties of minorities? This is the challenge to which deliberative
democracy is addressed.
B. The Deliberative Democracy Solution
1. General Principles
One difficulty in attempting to criticize deliberative democracy is that
it is sometimes difficult to define. Not all proponents of deliberative
democracy call it by that name, and the term itself has been invoked by
theorists approaching the problem of American politics from a wide variety
of perspectives, from classic liberalism to radical participatory democracy.
At the liberal end, for example, James Fishkin suggests that the poor
quality of contemporary American political discourse can be improved by
supplementing existing political campaign institutions with a "deliberative
opinion poll," in which a national sample of voters would meet intensively
with presidential candidates to discuss issues in depth.24 This solution is
fully compatible not only with classic liberalism, but also with existing
American political institutions. Toward the other end of the spectrum, Jane
Mansbridge thinks that the only way to improve deliberation meaningfully
is to alter existing institutions to include universal opportunities for direct,
participatory democracy in face-to-face encounters under a rule of consen-
sus." I will focus here far more on the latter varieties of deliberative
democracy, particularly those in which political deliberation-talk,
dialogue-is elevated to and commended as a way of life, for it is this
position that I wish ultimately to criticize.
Although the theorists who commend a life of talk sometimes disagree
even among themselves, they seem to agree on certain fundamentals. By
and large, these theorists accept some of the insights of both protective and
developmental democracy, and criticize each from the perspective of the
other. For example, writers such as Sunstein, Pateman, Ackerman, and
Gutmann generally agree with the protective democracy principle that
democratic institutions ought to enable citizens to protect their liberties from
government tyranny.26 At the same time, these theorists, along with others
24. JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION 81-86 (1991).
25. MANSBRIDGE, supra note 5.
26. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980)
[hereinafter ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE]; I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991);
1996]
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such as Arendt and Barber, agree with the position of developmental
democracy that the institutions of self-governance play a significant role in
constituting the characteristics of the polity, and that the institutions of
modem republican government involve citizens too little in self-governance,
thereby constituting a citizenry that is lethargic, politically unsophisticated,
and apathetic.2 Correspondingly, deliberative democrats praise the institu-
tions of direct democracy for their ability to support a meaningful political
life, but view direct democracy as excessively susceptible to misuse by a
tyrannical majority and thus insufficiently protective of individual rights and
liberties.2 8 Ultimately, deliberative democracy aims for a "preservative
transcendence"29 of both protective and developmental democracy that
incorporates only the best features of both. To accomplish this feat,
deliberative democracy theorists have drawn generously on recent develop-
ments in civic republican and communitarian thought.
2. Specific Features
The type of deliberative democracy with which I am concerned has four
basic and mutually supporting features: deliberation, diversity, openness, and
consensus. First and foremost, deliberative democracy institutes a form of
"government by discussion," 0 under which political outcomes "are to be
produced by an extended process of deliberation and discussion" '3 in
politics consisting of "an argumentative interchange among persons ...
jointly directed by them towards arriving at a reasonable answer to some
question of public ordering., 32  The ability to engage in this kind of
SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 3; PATEMAN, supra note 5; Gutmann,
Disharmony, supra note 3.
27. See, e.g., Gutmann, Disharmony, supra note 3, at 126 (criticizing "the general
condition of our politics"); ARENDT, supra note 4, at 237 (the people become lethargic when
they are deprived of a significant role in self-governance); see also BARBER, supra note 4.
28. See, e.g., FiSHKIN, supra note 24, at 21-64; Bessette, supra note 3, at 104-05.
29. CHRISTOPHER J. BERRY, THE IDEA OF A DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY 16 (1989)
[hereinafter BERRY, DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY]. Sunstein seems to get at this idea with his
paradoxical notion of"liberal republicanism." Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 14,
at 1566-71.
30. SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 3, at 162; see generallyCASS R.
SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN,
DEMOCRACY].
31. SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 3, at 134; accord BARBER, supra
note 4, at 173; Cohen, supra note 3, at 21; Stephen M. Feldman, Republican Reviv-
al/lInterpretive Turn, 1992 WiS. L. REV. 679, 680 (1992); James E. Fleming, Constructing
the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEx. L. REV. 211, 243 (1993); Steven G. Gey, The
Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 834-835 (1993);
Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 14, at 1548-49.
32. Michelman, Pornography Regulation, supra note 14, at 293.
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dialogue is sometimes said to be an absolute prerequisite to citizenship in
such a society.33 Deliberative democracy thus contemplates, in essence, a
life of political talk.
The second widely accepted feature of deliberative democracy is the
requirement of diversity.34 Theorists approaching the problem from
otherwise very different perspectives agree that the value of deliberation
depends critically on the diversity of the points of view expressed by the
participants. This kind of diversity not only maximizes the amount of
information put before the citizenry, thereby improving the quality of
political decisions,35 but also "can lead to new understandings of what [the
citizens'] interests are and where they lie."36 Put this way, the diversity
requirement is only a matter of common sense; if a society's members and
their opinions are homogeneous, deliberation is unnecessary, and its benefits
will be inaccessible to the society's citizens.
Third, precisely because they are diverse, citizens of a deliberative
democracy are duty-bound to approach the dialogic process in a spirit of
open-mindedness and flexibility.37  Deliberation inevitably involves
argument and persuasion.38 If this process is to be productive, the
participants must conduct the debate in good faith,39 and with a willingness
to open themselves "to 'othemess' as a way toward recognition not only of
the other, but also of oneself."' Put another way, democratic deliberation
33. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 70-71.
34. SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 3, at 24, 253: SUNSTEIN,
DEMOCRACY., supra note 30, at 21-22; Cohen, supra note 3, at 21; see also ARENDT, supra
note 4, at 225 (unanimous public opinion is incompatible with freedom of opinion because
opinion cannot be formed "without the benefit of a multitude of opinions held by others").
35. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 30, at 19; Bernard Manin, On Legitimacy
and Political Deliberation, 15 POL. THEORY 338, 355 (1987).
36. SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 3, at 253; see also id. at 24; Peter
Bachrach, Interest, Participation. and Democratic Theory, in NOMOS XVI, supra note 5
(individuals discover their real needs and interests through participation in politics). For an
especially expansive view of the scope of the dialogue to which the United States
Constitution is committed, see Robert Post, Managing Deliberation: The Quandary of
Democratic Dialogue, 103 ETHICS 654 (1993).
37. SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 3, at 23; Cohen, supra note 3, at
23-24; Frank 1. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional
Argument: Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REv. 443, 489 (1989) [hereinafter Michelman, Voting
Rights].
38. Manin, supra note 35, at 353.
39. Michelman, Traces, supra note 1, at 4, 40.
40. Id. at 33. Unlike the citizens of the pluralist democracy postulated by public
choice theory, citizens of a deliberative democracy are willing to change themselves: they do
not "try at all costs to protect their prepolitical understandings of interests and ends against
the possibility of change in political conflict or debate," but rather can "embrace such
changes as exercises of freedom rather than as impairments of integrity." Michelman, Voting
19961
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Should be modeled on and guided by the ideal of friendship.4' At the root
of this requirement of openness and friendship lies the notion that open,
dialogic engagement is, in the final analysis, the ultimate way to show
others the respect to which they are entitled as autonomous human
beings.42
The fourth, final, and most problematic feature of deliberative democra-
cy is its commitment to consensus. 3 There can be no question that
consensus plays an exceedingly important role in theories of deliberative
democracy. Joshua Cohen, for example, states unequivocally that the
purpose of deliberation is "to arrive at a rationally motivated consensus."
For Cass Sunstein, consensus is a "regulative ideal" '4 governing the entire
process of deliberative democracy. Nevertheless, the precise role of
consensus in deliberative democratic theory is frustratingly elusive. Because
part of my critique of deliberative democracy turns on its commitment to
consensus, I want to tread carefully here.
In most accounts of deliberative democracy, the prominent place of
consensus seems to grow directly from its other main features: when
democracy is conducted by dialogue among diverse individuals undertaken
in a good faith spirit of friendship and genuine openness, consensus at least
becomes possible in principle, and may result in fact.46 This proposition
raises two related questions.
First, how strongly do deliberative democracy theorists believe that an
open dialogic process will actually achieve consensus? In the maelstrom of
contemporary politics, the possibility of consensus sometimes seems so
remote that it is hard to imagine assigning it any kind of role in a realistic
political theory. One of the inconvenient facts of life is that people often
disagree, no matter how compelling the arguments that are laid before
them. 7 Moreover, even if dialogue could bring about consensus under
some limited set of circumstances-for example, a largely homogeneous
citizenry-deliberative democracy itself immediately subverts any realistic
Rights, supra note 37, at 450.
41. MANSBRIDGE, supra note 5, at 8-10.
42. Gutmann, Disharmony, supra note 3, at 141. Deliberative democracy appears in
this respect to have been influenced by Habermasian theories of communicative ethics, in
which dialogic engagement is understood as a form of respect crucial to fair argumentation,
and thus to legitimacy. See Benhabib, supra note 2, at 152.
43. SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 3, at 137; Cohen, supra note 3,
at 23.
44. Cohen, supra note 3, at 23 (emphasis deleted).
45. SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 3, at 137.
46. Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 14, at 1550, 1554-55; see also
MANSBRIDGE, supra note 5, at 3, 9-10, 26-28, 32; Gey, supra note 3 1, at 834; Fleming, supra
note 31, at 244.
47. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 54-58 (1993) (discussingthe dynamics
of disagreement).
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possibility of achieving consensus by insisting on diversity as a condition for
meaningful dialogue. If this diversity itself is to be meaningful in the sense
that citizens bring to the discussion genuinely distinctive viewpoints and
some degree of cognitive independence, consensus is highly unlikely.48 It
is worth recalling in this regard that Madison favored a large republic
because he believed that the diversity of its citizens would severely impair
the ability of majority factions to coalesce.49
Nevertheless, some deliberative democracy theorists seem to believe that
actual consensus really is possible. Sunstein, despite paying lip service to
the possibility that disagreement might persist even after deliberation,m
seems to think that consensus is truly inevitable if the deliberators approach
their task in the proper spirit.5 Others take more seriously the possibility
that irreconcilable differences may remain even after extensive dialogue and
debate. 2
48. See Diana T. Meyers, Democratic Theory and the Democratic Agent, in
MAJORITIES AND MINORITIES: NOMOS XXXII 129-33 (John W. Chapman & Alan Wertheimer
eds., 1990). Gey argues that the type of diversity courted by deliberative democracy is in
fact not meaningful-a "safe, suburban diversity." Gey, supra note 31, at 889.
49. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); see also text accompanying note
21.
50. E.g., SUNSTEN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 31, at 19.
51. See, e.g., Robin L. West, The Constitution of Reasons, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1409,
1432 (1994) (reviewing CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993) (attributing to
Sunstein the view that "through the exercise of reason ... we will reach consensus on
divisive moral issues")). This outlook goes hand in hand with the deliberative democracy
critique of public choice theories of democracy, in which political outcomes are seen as the
result of self-interested bargaining. SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 3, at 24-
25; Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 14, at 1545. This critique suggests strongly,
if implicitly, that failures to reach consensus result primarily from character flaws of the
deliberators-specifically, their inability to elevate their view toward the common good and
to transcend their selfish interests. E.g., Bessette, supra note 3, at 105; Sunstein, Republican
Revival, supra note 14, at 1545.
52. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 3, at 23 ("Even under ideal conditions there is no
promise that consensual reasons will be forthcoming."); Gutmann, Disharmony, supra note
3, at 148 (deliberative democracy "does not dissolve all conflicts among values" or
"guarantee that any single deliberator or community of deliberators will converge upon a
singularly correct resolution to a difficult problem"); id. at 155 ("well-informed collective
decisions are rarely unanimous"). See also Manin, supra note 35, at 359-61.
Some theorists seem aware that genuine consensus is too demanding a standard, and
have substituted a form of consensus that is weak to the vanishing point. For example,
Mansbridge writes that when the interests of group members conflict, consensus results
"either in deadlock in favor of the status quo or social pressure on dissenters to go along."
MANSBRIDGE, supra note 4, at 32. It is hard to see how the exertion of social pressure on
the minority is very different from the majoritarianism she criticizes as divisive. Mansbridge
tries to salvage her conception of consensus by arguing that meaningful consensus is not
vitiated when dissenters go along with the majority out of empathy, or by making the good
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Second, and far more important, how necessary is it for a society to
achieve consensus before taking collective action? Is consensus a formal
prerequisite to collective action? Or is it merely an ideal toward which we
ought to strive? And if consensus is merely an ideal, how diligently must
citizens strive, through open-minded dialogue, to attain it? Here deliberative
democracy theorists become frustratingly difficult to pin down. In my view,
a fair reading of the deliberative democracy literature suggests that
deliberative democracy as a political theory is founded on the notion that
political action is legitimate, and therefore permissible, only when a society
has either achieved actual consensus, however unlikely, or after society
members have made some extraordinary effort to achieve it.
Sunstein, for example, repeatedly characterizes his theory of deliberative
democracy as calling for a form of "government by discussion."53
Assuming that a precise and careful writer like Sunstein has chosen this
phrase more for its substantive accuracy than for its rhetorical appeal, he
seems to have revealed implicitly an underlying commitment to the
achievement of actual consensus, for the phrase "government by discussion"
is a contradiction in terms understood in any other way.
Governance is a means of taking collective action, and it therefore
requires some form of power or control; in Madison's words, "you must
first enable the government to control the governed and [then] . . . oblige
it to control itself. 54 Discussion, however, is not in ordinary terms a form
of control, and thus not a form of governance: you and I can discuss things,
but when the talking ends I retain the power to do what I want unless you
have some way of controlling my actions. Clearly, Sunstein is not thinking
of governance in ordinary terms: he has redefined it to mean collective
action implemented through persuasion rather than control. But governance
can be accomplished by persuasion only where unanimity is a prerequisite
to collective action; if anything less than unanimity authorizes collective
action, then we are talking about government by majoritarian rule rather
than by discussion.55  Thus, government by discussion-as opposed to
of the whole their own good. Id. at 26-28. But this kind of "consensus" is indistinguishable
in principle from majoritarianism. Achieving consensus by yielding before a vote is no
different from achieving consensus by yielding after the vote. Benello tries a similar tactic
in C. George Benello, Group Organization and Socio-politicalStructure, in PARTICIPATORY
DEMOCRACY, supra note 5, at 44-45 (consensus is achieved in groups not because all always
agree, but "because every member is aware of his continuing impact on the group, and is thus
capable of accepting occasional decisions in opposition to his own views").
53. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 31, at 19; SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION,
supra note 3, at 162. Sunstein credits Samuel Beer with having coined the phrase. See
SAMUEL H. BEER, To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 74,
264-75 (1993).
54. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
55. There is another contradiction inherent in this phrase. If collective action is ruled
out unless unanimous, then it is hard to see how a "government" is necessary at all; what we
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governance preceded by discussion-is possible only under the assumption
that actions are not taken except unanimously, or at the very least after some
extraordinary effort to achieve unanimity.
There is another way to reach the same conclusion about deliberative
democracy's commitment to consensus: unless deliberative democracy is
committed very strongly to the achievement of consensus, it is not
meaningfully distinct from standard liberal theories of protective democracy,
a distinction it claims. Deliberative democracy's other features--dialogue,
diversity, and openness--do not adequately distinguish it from liberal
democracy. Citizens can and ought to treat each other humanely and
respectfully in a liberal democracy, and the willingness to engage open-
mindedly in political discourse is not only compatible with, but obviously
desirable under, any such form of government.5 6 Thus, deliberative
democracy must embrace a strong consensus requirement if it is to avoid
collapsing into protective democracy, a theory it has set out to transcend."
Moreover, this commitment to consensus must be broad enough to
encompass virtually all types of collective action on any subject because
even consensus, at least in sparing doses, is hardly unique to deliberative
seem to have is a form of philosophical anarchism. See ROBERT P. WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF
ANARCHISM (1970); seealso AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 11 -12 (1987) ("Only
in a society in which all other citizens agreed with me would my moral ideal simply translate
into a political ideal. But such a society would have little need for politics .... ")
[hereinafter GUTMANN, EDUCATION]; Estlund, supra note 3, at 1447 (when individuals adopt
the interests of all others as their own, there is no need for a constitution). Sunstein responds
by claiming that some form of government is still necessary at least to police the conditions
that make popular discussion possible. SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 3, at
232; SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 31. The problem with this, however, is that we then
have government by control again. Such a government may also be a government by
discussion, but only in the trivial sense that any democratic government is a government by
discussion in virtue of leaving some decisions to the populace. Deliberative democracy, after
all, begins from the premise that the kind of discussion carried on in ordinary democracies
is inadequate because it is not meaningful-it is not the kind of discussion meant by the
phrase "government by discussion."
56. On this point, Terrance Sandalow has written:
Nothing in liberal theory requires a denial of the obvious, that politics may be a
process of collective deliberation in which the participants, through reasoned
argument, attempt to persuade and are open to persuasion by one another. Nor
does liberalism deny that collective deliberation may assist in locating common
ground among individuals with differing interests or views. Nor, finally, is there
any reason that liberals must deny that participation in politics may be
transformative, leading individuals not merely to compromise, but to alter their
initial objectives.
Terrance Sandalow, A SkepticalLook at ContemporaryRepublicanism, 41 FLA. L. REV. 523,
539 (1989); see also STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND
COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990).
57. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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democracy. It is commonplace even for ordinary liberal democracies to
require consensus or a supermajority for some socially significant decisions,
such as society-formation 8 or constitution-making. 9
Having described deliberative democracy's principal features, we are
now in a position to evaluate its merits. Deliberative democracy theorists
offer two reasons why we should embrace it. First, some proponents of
deliberative democracy contend that it is a political theory embraced by the
framers and therefore embedded in the Constitution. Second, advocates of
deliberative democracy claim that, regardless of its historical pedigree, it is
a meritorious political theory to which we ethically should adhere. I deal
with each of these claims in turn.
III. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY'S HISTORICAL CLAIMS
Theorists who claim a historical basis for deliberative democracy in the
thought of the framers rely on the thinnest of evidence, amounting largely
to a few scattered remarks by Madison. Most prominent among these is
Madison's defense of representative democracy in The Federalist No. 10,
where he claims that national representation is a means "to refine and
enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen
body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their
country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to
sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations."6° Fishkin, for example,
quotes this passage and then goes on immediately to conclude that, in
Madison's view, "representation may make possible greater deliberation."'
Even torn from its context, this passage provides scant support for Fishkin's
conclusion. In context, it is clear that what Madison meant by "refine and
enlarge the public views" was that the people's elected representatives were
likely to be wiser and more virtuous than the people themselves, 62 charac-
teristics they would bring to Congress, not acquire there through debate.
Sunstein also relies on some additional remarks in which some of the
framers favorably mention deliberation, the clashing of opinions, and the
value of open-mindedness in debate.63 In addition, he argues that certain
structural features of the Constitution, such as indirect election of the Senate
58. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 87, 89, 95-99
(C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980) (arguing that the formation of a society from the state of nature
is an act of mutual, voluntary, and unanimous consent).
59. See U.S. CONST. arts. V, VII.
60. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 54, at 82.
61. FiSHKIN, supra note 24, at 16.
62. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 54, at 82; see also H. Jefferson Powell,
Reviving Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1703, 1708 (1988).
63. SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 3, at 22, 24.
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and President and the system of checks and balances, were designed to
encourage discussion among government representatives. 64
To conclude from this evidence that the framers had in mind anything
remotely resembling a contemporary theory of deliberative democracy is to
commit a serious historical solecism. In the first place, this argument
incorrectly equates "deliberation" with "dialogue" or "discussion"-concepts
that were quite distinct in the late eighteenth century (as they are today).
Samuel Johnson's dictionary, for example, defines "deliberate" as "To think,
in order to choice [i.e., choose]."6 5  There is nothing about thinking,
however, that inherently requires discussion.
Fishkin and Sunstein's reading of "deliberation" as "dialogue" also
utterly ignores the reigning rationalist epistemology of the founding era.
The framers believed that moral truths, including the nature of the common
good, were objective and could be discovered through proper reasoning. 66
For example, Madison's conception of a "majority faction" as a group
"united and actuated by some common impulse or passion, or of interest,
adverse to ... the permanent and aggregate interests of the community," '67
is incomprehensible under any other assumption. Those who adopted the
Declaration of Independence went so far as to declare certain political and
moral truths to be "self-evident." '6 The value of discussion under these
circumstances seems slight. The framers did, of course, divide power
sharply, but this was hardly because they wanted to "encourage discussion
among different governmental entities."' What they wanted to do was
create an institutionalized form of governmental gridlock to safeguard the
people against the unpleasant possibility that "[e]nlightened statesmen will
not always be at the helm.
7°
A second and even more serious flaw in the claims of deliberative
democracy theorists is that their arguments conflate legislative deliberation
and popular deliberation. Again, the two are distinct in salient ways. It is
perfectly reasonable to suggest that legislatures ought to engage in some
degree of collective discussion to supplement the private reflection of the
delegates, and undoubtedly the framers anticipated that Congress would do
so.
71 But the justification for legislative deliberation is purely instrumental:
64. Id. at 23.
65. SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1756). The
definition remained unchanged as late as the 1813 edition. See id. at 167 (1813 ed.).
66. See MORTON WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION 20-
21, 217 (1987) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST].
67. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 54, at 78.
68. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see also MORTON WHITE,
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 9-60 (1978).
69. SUNSTErN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 3, at 23.
70. THE FEDERALIST No 10, supra note 54, at 80.
71. For example, Locke, and probably many of the framers, believed that a lack of
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it leads to better decisions. The justifications for deliberative democracy are
quite different, and inapplicable to legislative deliberation: surely the last
thing we want is for the members of a legislature to constitute themselves
a separate society by talking themselves into a collective identity different
from that of the people. Thus, arguments supporting a process of legislative
deliberation do not translate into support for deliberative democracy as a
way of life for citizens.
Finally, Sunstein claims to find additional support in the Supreme
Court's doctrine of rationality review.72  This doctrine requires the
government to justify its actions with reasons. But the justifying of
government action with reasons has no particular relation to discussion;
reasons can be chosen just as well through individual reflection. The Court
implicitly recognizes this by applying the rationality requirement indiscrimi-
nately to all government decisions whether made by plural government
decision makers like Congress, or individuals like agency officials. A far
more plausible explanation for rational basis review is the wholly Lockean
notion that unexplained governmental action is arbitrary, and arbitrary
government is illegitimate because it is a form of political slavery forbidden
by natural law.7
3
Just because deliberative democracy's historical claims are implausible,
however, does not mean that the theory can be dismissed; an independently
meritorious political theory still ought to demand our serious attention.7 4
Unfortunately, upon close examination, deliberative democracy is not such
a theory.
IV. THE INSTRUMENTAL BENEFITS OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
Although deliberative democracy theorists often set out the contours of
their theory with care, they are not always so plain about explaining why
deliberative democracy is a good political theory, and why we should prefer
it to other forms of democracy. Nevertheless, two such reasons are implicit
intellectual equipment and the leisure time to use it could prevent the proper exercise of
reason. See WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, supra note 66, at 217. Tocqueville
believed that the conditions of life in America, particularly the nearly universal devotion to
continual hard work, deprived most Americans of the leisure time necessary to cultivate
proper reasoning abilities. See I TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 4, at 207-08; 2 TOCQUEVILLE,
supra at 43-45; see also ARENDT, supra note 4, at 68-69; SHKLAR, supra note 4, at 67-68.
Thus, discussion might be practically necessary even among the most competent American
thinkers.
72. SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra notc 3, at 28-29; see also Cass R.
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 49-53, 69-72
(1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689
(1984).
73. LOCKE, supra note 58, at §§ 17, 22-24, 135-37, 159-68.
74. PHILIP BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991).
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in the deliberative democracy literature, one instrumental and the other
normative. From an instrumental perspective it might be said that dialogue
is a positive good, and deliberative democracy is the one form of govern-
ment that allows a society to reap fully the benefits of dialogue. Alterna-
tively, a straightforwardly normative reason for preferring deliberative
democracy is that it is simply a good way of life. In this Part, I want to
show why deliberative democracy's instrumental claims fail. The normative
claim is taken up in Part V.
A. Achieving the Benefits of Dialogue
As its name suggests, deliberative democracy purports to differ from its
non-deliberative cousins primarily in its stress on dialogue. Moreover, since
Americans now live under a form of democracy and already engage to some
degree in overtly political discourse, deliberative democracy, if it is to differ
meaningfully from standard liberal theories of protective democracy, must
be understood to contend that Americans do not talk enough, or that they
talk in some way improperly, or both. This justifies our asking: What is so
important about dialogue that leads deliberative democracy to demand so
much more of it? Talk, of course, takes time, and time is limited75 : "One
can discuss only for so long, and then one has to make a decision."76 If
we must talk so much more, and so much more meaningfully, than we
already do, what benefits can we expect to obtain?
Theorists approaching the problem from different perspectives have
suggested three possible benefits that might flow from the kind of dialogic
engagement recommended by deliberative democracy: collective self-
improvement of the citizenry, the forging of a collective identity, and the
enhancement of governmental legitimacy. None of these benefits, however,
makes much of a case for the instrumental superiority of deliberative
democracy.77
75. See DAHL, supra note 5, at 33-34; JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES 17, 38 (1983).
For further discussion of some of the potential disadvantages of dialogue, see Frederick
Schauer, DeliberatingAbout Deliberation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1187 (1992) (reviewing BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: 1: FOUNDATIONS (1991)) and Frederick Schauer, Discourse
and Its Discontents (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Tennessee Law Review).
76. ELSTER, supra note 75, at 38.
77. Some theorists have identified as a fourth benefit of enhanced discourse the
improvement of the quality of political decisions by facilitating the collection of information
and by testing policy alternatives for weaknesses. E.g., FISHKIN, supra note 24, at 30-31, 81-
86; GEORGE F. WILL, RESTORATION: CONGRESS, TERM LIMITS AND THE RECOVERY OF
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 103 (1992); Bessette, supra note 3, at 105-06; Galston, supra
note 3, at 355-56; see also Manin, supra note 35, at 351-52. This seems more like a
makeweight argument, for it seems more at home in a theory of protective democracy, and
certainly does not justify a transcendent theory of deliberative democracy. No theory of
democracy is indifferent to the quality of democratic decision making, nor does any
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1. Self-improvement of the Citizenry
The first benefit of enhanced discourse is said to be the collective self-
improvement of the citizenry.78 Deliberative democracy, however, is not
well suited to deliver such a benefit because of its strong emphasis on
consensus. In fact, the more strongly deliberative democracy is committed
to the achievement of consensus, thereby successfully distinguishing itself
from traditional liberal forms of protective democracy, the more severely it
impedes the delivery of the developmental benefits of dialogic engagement.
Deliberative democracy theorists are surely correct to note that participa-
tion alone will not improve the quality of political discourse or constitute
citizens who are alert, interested and politically alive. To provide these
benefits, the participation must be meaningful. Participation is only
meaningful, however, when it is a means by which citizens can play a
significant role in shaping the decisions that affect their lives.79 For this
condition to hold, citizens must feel that there is some reasonable prospect
for their participation to lead eventually to actions that affect them.80
When democratic deliberation is conducted under a requirement either
of actual consensus or of something approaching actual consensus, citizens
are unlikely to experience the sense of self-mastery necessary for them to
benefit from the deliberative process. If consensus or near-consensus is a
prerequisite to collective action, then little of consequence ever will be done.
Citizens can talk all they want, but their talk ultimately disappears into a
black hole. Deprived of the satisfaction of seeing their talk translated into
social action, the citizens of a deliberative democracy are likely to
democratic theory deny that careful consideration is better than haphazard consideration. If
anything, deliberative democracy seems ill-suited to accomplish this task since it demands
a kind of dialogic engagement that goes far beyond the mere exchanging of whatever
information may be necessary to make sound decisions, and might actually impede a society
from putting this information to any kind of good use in the ways described below.
Bruce Ackerman takes the somewhat different, though related, view that talk is necessary
to discover particular pieces of vital information: the scope of moral disagreement, and
whether any accommodation among disparate groups is possible. Bruce Ackerman, Why
Dialogue?, 86 J. PHIL. 5 (1989). For a critique of his position, see Benhabib, supra note 2,
at 154-55.
78. ARENDT, supra note 4, at 253-54;BARBER, supra note 4, at 136-37, 155;
SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 31, at 244-45; Michelman, Foreword, supra note 1, at
19.
79. MILL, supra note 19, at 328.
80. BARBER, supra note 4, at 117-39; C. George Benello & Dimitrios Roussopoulos,
Introduction to PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY, supra note 5; David Braybrooke, The Meaning
of Participation and of Demands For It: A Preliminary Survey of the Conceptual Issues, in
PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS: NoMos XVI, supra note 5, at 59 (demand for participation are
demands to "act in ways capable of making a significant difference to the [political]
outcome").
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experience dialogue as a burden-a kind of wasteful, tedious, and purely
formal ritual useful only to demonstrate some form of socially mandatory
respect for fellow citizens. Deliberative democracy's continual striving for
consensus thus hobbles dialogue by undermining its power to benefit the
citizenry.
2. Forging Collective Identity
A second benefit of dialogue, suggested in more communitarian-oriented
accounts of deliberative democracy, is the forging of a collective identity.8"
Dialogue is said to accomplish this result because it is the process by which
citizens produce, or in some accounts discover, the shared understandings
that collectively constitute them as a society.12 In addition, the bonds of
community are strengthened simply by the joint participation of citizens in
the common task of dialogic self-govemance. 3 Once again, deliberative
democracy is hardly uniquely suited to provide such benefits, and there is
reason to think it is less well-suited than other forms of democracy.
First, it is fanciful to suppose that the kind and amount of dialogue that
takes place in any large, contemporary republic is inadequate to the purpose
of producing or discovering significant shared understandings. A group of
8 1. Michelman, Voting Rights, supra note 37, at 451; ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE,
supra note 26, at 100.
82. For a perceptive discussion and critique of these approaches, see BERRY,
DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY, supra note 29, and Christopher J. Berry, Shared Understanding
and the Democratic Way of Life, in DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY: NOMOs XXXV (John W.
Chapman & Ian Shapiro eds., 1993) [hereinafter Berry, Shared Understanding]. Some of the
leading legal expositors of deliberative democracy seem equivocal about whether deliberation
leads to the discovery of shared, external standards of political truth, or whether dialogue is
the process by which shared understandings are created and then, in consequence of having
been agreed to, elevated to the status of political truth. Cass Sunstein, for example, never
makes his position entirely clear. Compare SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note
3, at 26 (legislators "select values through deliberation and debate"), 134-35 (preferences are
formed in discussion, not brought to it), 178 (in deliberation "citizens decide .. who they
are-what their values are and what those values require") with SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY,
supra note 30, at 243 ("[p]ublic deliberation may reveal truth or falsity of factual claims
about the state of the world").
Steven Gey, however, understands Sunstein to hold an objective conception of civic
virtue that is discovered, rather than created, through deliberation. Gey, supra note 31, at
809. By way of contrast, compare Feldman, supra note 31, at 68 (propounding a theory of
"republican interpretivism" in which the function of dialogue is to identify the common good,
but contingently, as part of a continual process of reconstituting truths and the cultural
understandings that make them possible) with Estlund, supra note 3, at 1468-69 (propounding
a theory of "epistemic proceduralism" in which democratic deliberation is the process by
which citizens come to know an independent standard of truth and to make political decisions
that are more often substantively just than under other competing procedures).
83. BARBER, supra note 4, at 152.
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strangers, with no common history, experiences or ideas, might need to talk
for a considerable period to discover the kinds of shared understandings
necessary to constitute a meaningful community. But political dialogue
never occurs in such a setting. A real society, as opposed to an abstract,
hypothetical one, already has shared understandings; without them it could
hardly function as a society. It also stands to reason that the longer a
society has existed, the deeper and broader the shared understandings of its
members. Thick shared understandings may never relieve a society of the
need to make collective decisions, but such understandings might well
render dialogue largely unnecessary for decision making in many instanc-
es.
84
Second, societies constitute their collective identities just as much
through action as through dialogue. Who we are is not merely a function
of what we say; it is also decidedly a function of what we do.85 Further-
more, a society constitutes itself at least as much in its daily routine of un-
self-conscious human interaction as it does in its more transcendent
moments of purposeful political discussion. Shared understandings and
communal bonds are not forged solely in the heat of active dialogic
engagement; on the contrary, they are also-perhaps principally-generated
incrementally, through the gradual, everyday accretion of shared experienc-
es. 86 Moreover, these everyday activities need not even be experienced by
the participants as political. The forging of a common identity is thus, in
Jon Elster's term, a "byproduct"-a benefit that cannot be realized unless
undertaken in pursuit of "a serious purpose which goes beyond that of
achieving this satisfaction. ' ,87 In this sense, deliberative democracy is not
nearly as different as its proponents seem to think from its spiritual opposite:
a democracy in which the people make decisions by voting without
significant prior discussion.88
84. An example of this can be found, strangely enough, in Jane Mansbridge's glowing
account of a town meeting in a tiny New England community. See Mansbridge, supra note
5, at 39. In considering an agenda of more than two dozen items, Mansbridge reports,
meaningful debate appears to have taken place on only two items, the school budget and
zoning. Id. at 54-58. The last few items on the agenda, we are told, "passed unanimously
with little discussion." Id. at 58. Thus, discussion was unnecessary; the citizens could decide
how to act by voting immediately. Note that this result does not depend on the existence of
social consensus; if a shared understanding is widely but not universally held, a vote could
be taken without significant dialogue under a majoritarian rule of decision.
85. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 181-87 (1958) [hereinafter
ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION].
86. See West, supra note 51.
87. ELSTER, supra note 75, at 91.
88. As Hannah Arendt has written: "In [both] acting and speaking, men show who
they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in
the human world... " ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 85, at 179.
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3. Enhanced Legitimacy
The third and final benefit of discourse suggested by deliberative
democracy theorists is its ability to enhance the legitimacy of political
decisions. As Amy Gutmann has written, "[d]eliberative democracy
legitimates the collective judgment resulting from deliberative proce-
dures." 9 Or, in the words of Bernard Manin, deliberative decisions are
legitimate "because they are, in the last analysis, the outcome of the
deliberative process taking place before the universal audience of all the citizens."9°
89. Gutmann, Disharmony, supra note 3, at 148; see also BARBER, supra note 4, at
170 (norms of political judgment are "produced by an ongoing process of... deliberation
... and... are legitimized solely by that process"); SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 31,
at 72 (respect is due only to the "consideredjudgments of a democratic polity" reached under
the conditions appropriate to democratic choice); Cohen, supra note 3, at 21 ("free
deliberation among equals is the basis of legitimacy"); Michelman, Pornography Regulation,
supra note 14, at 317 (legitimacy of Constitution as higher law depends on conception of
political process as deliberative rather than strategic); Post, supra note 36, at 660 (democracy
reconciles individual autonomy with collective self-determination by "subordinating
governmental decision making to communicative processes sufficient to instill in citizens a
sense of participation, legitimacy, and identification").
David Estlund adds an additional condition: for him, "[a] decision is made legitimate
by being chosen in an actual deliberative democratic procedure that tends-though
imperfectly-to produce substantially just decisions." Estlund, supra note 3, at 1469.
90. Manin, supra note 35, at 359. There is an obvious and somewhat disturbing
circularity to these explanations in which deliberative democracy legitimates itself by being
the only political system that is both deliberative and democratic. But it is unclear why
decisions reached democratically without deliberation, or deliberatively under a non-
democratic regime, are not legitimate. One possibility is that decisions that are not produced
under conditions of both deliberation and wide participation are unlikely to be good
decisions; but this is an instrumental objection, which implies a theory of protective liberal
democracy that deliberative democracy aims to transcend. A different resolution might be
that the individual and collective benefits of political participation and community cannot be
achieved unless political decisions are made under circumstances of genuine deliberation and
widely distributed participation, but under this explanation the theory collapses into
developmental democracy, which deliberative democracy hopes to transcend due to
developmental democracy's inadequate attention to the protection of liberty. This is precisely
the instability identified by Berry, and the reason he deems deliberative democracy a noble
failure. See BERRY, DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY, supra note 29; Berry, Shared Understanding,
supra note 82; see also Gey, supra note 31, at 810 (mounting a similar attack on civic
republicanism's treatment of civic virtue and collective action, and accusing republicans of
"ascribing to certain kinds of collective action an almost mystical significance").
Another possible explanation relies on the discourse ethics of itirgen Habermas. See,
e.g., JORGEN HABERMAS, REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY (Thomas
McCarthy trans., 1984). Indeed, Joshua Cohen ascribes the similarity of his and Bernard
Manin's writings on deliberative democracy to their independent reliance on Habermas.
Cohen, supra note 3, at 33 n. 12. However, Habermas has now made quite plain that his
theory ofdiscourseethics cannot prescribe in any particular situation when individuals should
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To assess the value of deliberative democracy in these terms, we must
first understand what precisely about deliberative democracy confers this
legitimacy. Presumably, legitimacy under deliberative democracy derives
in large part from the commitment of such a society to diverse, open-minded
dialogue. But it seems equally clear that this legitimacy cannot depend
upon every communication within a society satisfying these conditions-no
real community could possibly measure up. On the other hand, surely some
communication in any society, whatever its form of government, must meet
these conditions. If so, then legitimacy under deliberative democracy is a
matter of degree rather than of kind, and the critical question becomes
whether deliberative democracy provides significantly greater legitimacy
than other forms of democracy, and at an acceptable cost.
Deliberative democracy itself, unfortunately, does not provide us with
any tools for assessing when social discourse is "good enough" to legitimate
collective action, or when more talk needs to occur in order either to convert
an illegitimate decision into a legitimate one, or to enhance legitimacy to the
point where the benefits of additional legitimacy exceed the costs of trying
to achieve it.9 Moreover, the costs of achieving legitimacy under delibera-
tive democracy increase rapidly depending upon how strongly it insists upon
the achievement of consensus as a condition for collective action. This puts
deliberative democracy in something of a bind. The more strenuously its
proponents claim that it is different from liberal forms of protective
democracy, the more they are driven to rely upon consensus as a distin-
guishing requirement. But the more strongly deliberative democracy
theorists insist upon consensus as a condition for collective action, the less
likely it is that any significant collective action will ever qualify as
legitimate.
Here, I think, we have hit upon an illuminating characteristic of
deliberative democracy, one that suggests a rather different way of
understanding it. In the next section, I raise the possibility that deliberative
democracy, at bottom, is not really directed to the improvement of politics
through discourse, but is instead a political theory designed primarily to
justify a radical form of protection for political minorities. Specifically, it
provides ajustification for virtually permanent social inaction, apparently on
the theory that if people can be kept talking they will not act, and if they do
not act, majorities will be unable to do serious harm to the interests of
minorities.
talk and when they should act. Habermas, supra note 2, at 83 ("a sepratejustification would
be required to explain why the normative content discovered in the pragmatic presuppositions
of argumentation should have the power to regulate action").
A final explanation is Aristotelian and holds that the legitimating power of deliberative
democracy derives from its intrinsic value as a substantively good life. This is the approach
I adopt in Part V, in which I argue that the life of deliberative democracy is far from good.
91. See Habermas, Discourse Ethics, supra note 2, at 60-110.
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B. The Society of Endless Talk
We have seen how the problem of American politics to which delibera-
tive democracy claims to respond is the problem of improving the quality
of political life without sacrificing the rights of minorities. My contention
is that deliberative democracy tends to favor at nearly every turn the
protection of minorities over the improvement of politics, and we can begin
to see this by examining its conception of individual autonomy. Let us start
with deliberative democracy's notion of respect.
Deliberative democracy theorists who write about respect seem to agree
that deliberation, understood as debate or dialogue, is the only way in which
a society shows genuine respect for the individual autonomy of its
citizens.92 But why is this so? One could say that it is just as or more
respectful of individual autonomy to respect a citizen's judgment regardless
of whether that judgment has been preceded by dialogue.93 Evidently
deliberative democracy does not deem such judgments worthy of respect
Why not?
One possibility is that judgments untested by dialogue are more likely
to be poor quality judgments because they will be based on inadequate
information, or inadequate exploration of their weaknesses. But one hardly
needs a theory of deliberative democracy to justify this position: a standard
liberal theory of protective democracy will do just as well.94 The real
reason why deliberative democracy disfavors judgments untested by dialogue
has nothing to do with the judgment itself, but with the process by which
it is formed: deliberative democracy disfavors judgments formed without
dialogue because such judgments result from a process that is not respectful
of others.95 People who make such judgments have not adequately opened
themselves to the possibility of persuasion or, perhaps worse, seek to enter
the political process at the point of exercising raw majoritarian power
without having first tried diligently to persuade others to their point of
view.96
92. See Gutmann, Disharmony, supra note 3; see also Michelman, Foreword, supra
note 1, at 33, 40-41.
93. This is, for example, the position of utilitarianism. See JOHN S. MILL,
UTILITARIANISM, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 129, 141 (John Gray ed., 1991). It is
also the position that Richard Fallon calls "ascriptive autonomy." Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two
Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REv. 875, 878 (1994). Gutmann criticizes the position
under the label of "populist democracy." Gutmann, Disharmony, supra note 3, at 129, 134.
94. See, e.g., FISHKIN, supra note 24.
95. Manin, supra note 35; Gutmann, Disharmony, supra note 3, at 140-46.
96. Cohen, supra note 3, at 23-24; Gutmann, Disharmony, supra note 3; see also
Michelman, Pornography Regulation, supra note 14, at 291-304 (rejecting strategic view of
politics).
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At work here is a vision of citizenship that imposes a duty to attempt
to seek the approval of all before going ahead and simply taking collective
action, even when it would be possible to do so because of clear and
perhaps even overwhelming majority support for the contemplated action.
The citizen of a deliberative democracy must, it seems, make some kind of
serious attempt to obtain at least the "blessing," if not the actual agreement,
of interested minority groups before taking collective political action. This
is of course a position that accords well with some contemporary judgments
about the need to pay proper respect to minorities.
There are at least two difficulties with this aspect of deliberative
democracy. The first is a practical difficulty resulting from the possibility
that minorities might abuse their entitlement to dialogic respect. Such abuse
can occur-when minorities attempt to use dialogic engagement not merely
as an opportunity to persuade the majority on the merits of the question
under debate, but to determine in addition the content of respect itself.
Thus, a minority group might argue that respectful treatment requires not
only good faith debate, but also an acknowledgement of the truth or merit
of some underlying claim or value. We sometimes see such a move in the
more extreme claims of multiculturalism.97 These claims must be rejected,
however, because what constitutes a respectful dialogic encounter is
something that a society can only decide collectively; it cannot be dictated
by groups or individuals.98 Further, such claims undermine deliberative
democracy's goal of meaningful dialogue: if some claims are off the table,
the range and quality of the dialogue can only suffer.99
The other difficulty is far more serious, and brings us to the second way
in which deliberative democracy's conception of autonomy tilts decisively
in favor of the protection of minorities. In a nutshell, deliberative
democracy's ultimate goal seems to be to provide minorities with a means
of protecting the integrity of their identity. This goal, however, rests on
flawed conceptions of how identity is formed, and the degree of control that
groups and individuals are capable of exercising over their identity.
Our identities are constituted by our life experiences. These experiences
not only provide us with information about the world, but shape the way we
perceive it.100 Certainly the most direct and obvious influences on our
97. See, e.g.,CHARLES TAYLOR, MULTICULTURALISM AND THE POLITICS OF RECOGNI-
TION 64-66 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1992).
98. Id. at 70; see also Susan Wolf, Comment, in id. at 78.
99. See Post, supra note 36, at 659-63. This is Post's reason for rejecting suggestions
made by Sunstein and others that the First Amendment ought to be construed to permit
government intervention designed to improve the quality of public dialogue. Id.
100. Quite a range of thinkers have taken this position. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, IS
THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (1980); HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD
(1975); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1984); RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND
THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979); MICHAEL SANDEL, THE LIMITs OF LIBERALISM (1984);
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identities come in the form of dialogic encounters, particularly those in
which others try to persuade us to adopt some belief or point of view. But
our identities are also influenced by our environment, to which we
inevitably react, and those who have the power to influence our environment
have the power indirectly to influence our identities.
One way in which this latter type of influence is exercised is in the
political arena, through political action."' For example, suppose a society
contemplates passing a law legalizing euthanasia. Whether it passes the law
will depend on the background values, beliefs and understandings-the
identity-of the citizens. If the society passes the law, however, it will then
have become a society that has legalized euthanasia, a fact which inevitably
affects those same background understandings of the citizens, and changes
who they are. A citizen of a society with legalized euthanasia has slightly
different experiences, and thus a slightly different identity, than a citizen of
a society that prohibits euthanasia. For some citizens the two experiences
might differ in genuinely transforming ways.
What deliberative democracy seeks to do is restrict the field in which
identity is formed to the arena of dialogue, and to rule out of bounds
attempts to influence the identity of others indirectly through political action
taken over their objection. The intention seems to be to establish a set of
ground rules for fair play in the political struggle over collective identity.
The deliberative democrat wants to say: "You can change who I am by
attempting to persuade me, face to face, in a fair and open dialogic
encounter. Go ahead and take your best shot. But you can't try to change
me by sneaking around behind my back and using your majoritarian control
over government to pass laws that will eventually transform me into
someone that I'm not and don't wish to become." In dialogue, the
reasoning goes, the participants are in control; they can accept or reject
arguments, and in so doing control the content of their identities. °2
JAMES B. WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION (1990).
101. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 961 (1992); Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of
Public Policy, 89 MICH. L. REV. 936 (1991); Michael H. Shapiro, Regulation As Language:
Communicating Values By Altering the Contingencies of Choice, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 681
(1994).
102. There are striking parallels between deliberative democracy and Calhoun's theory
of concurrent majorities. Calhoun argued that society is composed of different interests, and
that majoritarian government merely grants to one interest the power to tyrannize the others.
JOH4N C. CALHOUN, A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT AND SELECTIONS FROM THE
DISCOURSES 13-14 (C. Gordon Post ed., 1953). The key to preventing this kind of tyranny,
he claimed, is to "give to each division or interest.., either a concurrent voice in making
and executing the laws or a veto on their execution." Id. at 20. This will confine the
government to taking only measures that "promote the prosperity of all." Id. at 30. But
where Calhoun thought these measures necessary to protect minorities' property, deliberative
democracy deems them necessary to protect minority identity.
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This reasoning is fatally flawed: deliberative democracy cannot provide
minorities with an effective means of preventing impairment of the integrity
of their own identities because no group's identity is wholly within its
control. Group identity is a constantly evolving product of background
social understandings. It may well be that deliberative democracy, by
granting minorities a veto over collective political action, might slow the
process by which a minority's identity gradually evolves. It might also give
minorities more of a sense of control over their own destinies by creating
the illusion that minorities are going along only with measures with which
they agree. 103 But deliberative democracy cannot prevent minority identity
from being influenced by its environment, and the way the majority talks
and acts in normal everyday life will inevitably change the minority
regardless of whether the majority is able to enact its beliefs into law." 4
V. THE NORMATIVE VIEW: DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP
A. The Windy Citizen
At this point, a deliberative democrat might make the following
response. All these objections are beside the point: they proceed from the
premise that democratic dialogue is merely a means to some other end, such
as the creation of a collective identity or the protection of minorities. The
instrumental benefits of deliberation are not unimportant, but the primary
reason why citizens of a democracy should deliberate is simply because a
dialogic life is a substantively good life.' 5 Furthermore, because the
dialogic life is substantively good, it constitutes citizens who possess the
character and exercise the virtues of the good democratic citizen." 6
This is a cogent response, and it is probably the best one that can be
made on behalf of deliberative democracy. But it is unavailing. In fact, the
life of talk contemplated by deliberative democracy is not particularly good.
One need hardly regret, with Machiavelli and Arendt, the overthrow of
103. 1 have set out this position more fully in James A. Gardner, The Ambiguity of
Legal Dreams: A Communitarian Defense of JudicialRestraint, 71 N.C. L. REV. 805 (1993).
104. This problem forms a severe tension in Cass Sunstein's work especially. Sunstein
is strongly committed to deliberative democracy, but he also follows Elster in postulating a
process of "adaptive preference formation" in which people's opinions can be influenced
decisively by their environment. Compare Su-NSTEFr, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note
3, at 162-94 with ELSTER, supra note 75, at 1-108.
105. For a discussion of whether this claim is one of intrinsic goodness or really an
instrumental claim according to which the value of some version of democracy depends on
its consequences, see Smith, supra note 5, at 133-34.
106. See Galston, supra note 3; see also GUTMANN, EDUCATION, supra note 55.
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antiquity's vita activa at the hands of Christianity °7 to reach this conclu-
sion. Rather, one need only recognize that deliberation can never be solely
an end in a society in which self-governance has any meaning; any plausible
account of deliberation must accord it some instrumental component as well.
And if deliberation has any kind of instrumental component, then there
necessarily comes a time when talk may stop; there may even come a point
when too much talk can be harmful. The only alternative is to maintain that
active dialogic democracy is the highest state of human existence, and what
is important is not the quality of democratic decisions, or even that any
decisions be made at all, but that we talk things over. But this is just too
extreme a vision; even Socrates, history's most dedicated talker, periodically
shut up and went to war.
The deficiencies of deliberative democracy are even better illustrated by
examining the kind of citizens it is likely to constitute. Deliberative
democracy theorists seem to think that these citizens will be generous, open-
minded and self-sacrificing. For the reasons set out in the previous section,
I think it far more likely that deliberative democracy would constitute
citizens who are ineffectual, tyrannical, obstructionist, and in general poorly
suited for the kind of life demanded of citizens in a large, modem republic.
First, citizens of a deliberative democracy are likely to live in a constant
state of frustration because they are unable to live up to deliberative
democracy's unrelenting demands of openness, good faith, and authenticity
in dialogue. Every debate cut off in heated argument or terminated short of
agreement is a failure, and deliberative democracy implies that the failure
is one of character because it likely results from laziness and insufficient
openness.
Second, citizens of a deliberative democracy are likely to be uncoopera-
tive and obstructionistic."l8 Many of the personal benefits of democracy
flow, as we have seen, from the sense of self-mastery that citizens gain
when they have an opportunity to participate meaningfully in the govern-
mental processes that affect their lives. Because deliberative democracy is
so heavily weighted toward protecting minorities, and because it so strongly
emphasizes consensus, just about the only way for citizens to feel like they
are actually influencing the process of collective decision making is to
exercise a veto. Moreover, since deliberative democracy indirectly teaches
minorities the legitimacy of maintaining the integrity of group or individual
identity against outside pressures for change, people who believe that they
are in the minority are especially likely to dig in their heels, further
obstructing the possibility of collective political action. 9
107. See ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 85, at 77-78.
108. For a parallel critique of civic republicanism, see Michael A. Fitts, Look Before
You Leap: Some Cautionary Notes on Civic Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1651, 1655-57
(1988).
109. Aristotle believed that good rulers needed to learn first how to be ruled.
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Third, deliberative democracy is likely to constitute citizens who are
self-centered rather than open as a result of grounding its conception of
dialogic encounter on a deep notion of respect. It is all too easy under those
circumstances for citizens whose views are rejected on the merits to interpret
such rejections not as a sign of the weakness of their opinions, but as a sign
that their audience failed to attend to the argument in an appropriately
respectful manner. The result may be extensive special pleading under the
guise of demands for respect.
Finally, citizens of a deliberative democracy are likely to be ineffectual.
The only public training they receive is in persuasion, so they are unable to
organize for action. Because they must always remain open to persuasion,
they are forever preparing to act, but never acting, and their opinions are
always provisional.
Life in a large, modem, heterogeneous republic requires plenty of talk,
to be sure, but it also requires action. Peace, security, prosperity, and
liberty do not consist in talk alone; they are goals to be achieved through
acts performed on the public stage. A world that requires action necessarily
requires that its inhabitants be able to formulate opinions that are good
enough, and in which they have sufficient confidence, to guide and justify
the kinds of actions that people are sometimes called upon to take. The
citizens of a deliberative democracy are simply not the kind of citizens who
would flourish under the conditions of modem society, and life among them
is not likely to be satisfying.
B. An Alternative: The Madisonian Citizen
I conclude by sketching some of the rudiments of an alternative concep-
tion of citizenship, suitable for the conditions of life in a large, diverse
republic like the contemporary United States. As these citizens live in a
republic, I would like to call them "republican" citizens, but the word has
been pretty fully expropriated by civic republicanism. I will settle for
calling my citizens "Madisonian" to emphasize that they live in a
Madisonian republic characterized by large size, a diverse citizenry, and
indirect democracy in which the daily business of government is conducted
by popularly elected officials." 0
My conception of the Madisonian citizen is guided by four main
considerations. First, Madisonian citizens should have the characteristics
necessary to avoid falling into the twin traps that define the problem of
contemporary American politics. Thus, Madisonian citizens should want to
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra note 15, at 103-05 (Ill.iv, §§ 9-16; 1277a-b); see also THOMAS
L. PANGLE, THE ENNOBLING OF DEMOCRACY 105 (1992). Deliberative democracy makes
no provision for such an education.
I 0. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 39, at 77-84, 240 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
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be actively engaged in politics in order to reap the personal and collective
benefits of developmental democracy, and they should be capable of doing
so. At the same time, they need to observe the prescription of protective
democracy that the rights and liberties of minorities not be trampled in the
process. Thus, they should be respectful of minorities. This gives us:
1. Citizens should be substantially engaged by the political process;
and
2. Citizens should exhibit a high degree of concern and respect for the
views of minorities.
Up to this point, the characteristics of Madisonian citizens do not differ
from those of deliberative democrats. However, a third consideration sets
the Madisonian citizen apart. Citizens ought to have a conception of the
good and some kind of plan for achieving the good as they understand
it.' Not all conceptions of the good are equivalent; deliberative demo-
crats are certainly correct to demand that citizens conceive and pursue an
affirmative vision of the common good rather than undertake the kind of
egoistic, self-interested strategizing approved by public choice theory.
However, Madisonian citizens are not confined to the achievement of their
visions of the common good by persuasion. On the contrary, Madisonian
citizens not only have personal visions of the common good, but believe that
they should pursue their visions through action, and that political action is
the most effective way to implement the common good as they understand
it. Thus,
3. Citizens should be willing, and even eager, to pursue their concep-
tions of the common good through political action.
Finally, the last consideration is practical, and is designed to set a realistic
constraint:
4. Citizens should be able to meet the first three conditions within
institutions that are feasible in a Madisonian republic.
Of course, these criteria are broad enough to encompass quite a range
of citizen characteristics, so I will content myself with mentioning just three:
Madisonian citizens' conception of politics; the nature of their participation;
and their experience of politics.
1. Conception of politics. Madisonian citizens see politics as an
opportunity to implement laws or establish regimes for the common good.
They like democracy because it allows them far greater access to the
political process than other forms of government, thus giving them more and
better chances to use politics to achieve their goals. Madisonian citizens
may even take pride in their skills at influencing the political process to
achieve the goals that motivate their activism.
2. Nature of participation. Madisonian citizens want sincerely to see
the common good implemented. They are responsibly reflective, and
11l. This notion is similar to the Rawlsian concept of a life plan. See JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 407-16 (1971).
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engage in reflection and discussion, within pertinent time constraints, to
formulate conceptions of the common good with which they are satisfied.
But once they have formed a conception of the common good, they are
competitive in the pursuit of political success. They have distinct goals and
want to see those goals implemented-over the objection of those who
disagree, if necessary. To this end, they are prepared to organize with other
citizens, to attempt to persuade others as seems appropriate, and to vote their
inclinations. They see success in bringing their vision to fruition as a kind
of excellence, which they strive to cultivate.
In addition, Madisonian citizens are not unmoved by the possibility of
public praise and positive historical evaluation, though they view these
accolades as secondary to the personal satisfaction of helping to bring about
the common good. Their heroes include Abraham Lincoln, Franklin D.
Roosevelt, and Martin Luther King, Jr,-individuals who were thoughtful
yet decisive, who tirelessly pursued their visions of the public good and
were willing to take steps to force it on those who did not share it.
Madisonian citizens understand that their approach to politics entails
risks-they can be wrong as well as right-but they believe that the
potential benefits justify the risks, and that the risks can be somewhat
mitigated by careful study, continuing reflection, and a willingness
periodically to reconsider their views in the face of novel arguments or new
evidence. Madisonian citizens view the career of Lyndon B. Johnson as a
kind of cautionary tale. Johnson pursued his vision of the common good
and implemented it with enormous success, and when he was right he was
as right as anyone could be; but his mistakes were equally colossal.'
12
Madisonian citizens hope that they can learn how to avoid Johnson's errors
as well as imitate his successes.
3. Experience of politics. Madisonian citizens experience politics as
bonding, not divisive. Their brand of politics is competitive, but not hostile;
perhaps "sporting" describes it best. In their politics, winners do not
eradicate losers; losers do not peevishly refuse to go along with collective
decisions with which they disagree; and everybody, winners and losers alike,
remains loyal to the larger political community. Madisonian citizens believe
in fair play in politics, and in the possibility of losing honorably. They
respect opponents who put up a spirited fight, and demand such respect in
return. They respond to their losses with continued loyalty and expect
others to do the same, and they resent those who do not take losing well.
Although Madisonian citizens are open to dialogic persuasion, the high
value they place on principled political action makes them quite responsive
to a wholly different form of persuasion, persuasion by principled example.
Thus, they may find persuasive value in being consistently outvoted when
in the minority and, when in the majority, in consistently outvoting a
112. 1 am thinking, of course, of Johnson's civil rights successes, and his failure
regarding Vietnam.
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committed (but loyal) minority of dissenters. In the latter case, for example,
Madisonian citizens will admire the persistence and principled example set
by the dissenters, which may in turn cause Madisonian citizens in the
majority to wonder what makes the minority hold its view so strongly.
Madisonian citizens are willing to acknowledge that the strength of the
minority's beliefs may be evidence of the correctness of those beliefs, and
that a reevaluation of the majority position may be called for. But the key
here is action. In the view of Madisonian citizens, talk can be effective, but
it is cheap; action in conformity with talk, however, speaks far more
powerfully and effectively.
VI. CONCLUSION
The theater critic Jan Kott once wrote that tragedy lies in "the necessity
of making a choice between opposing values." But, he went on, "[t]he
tragic situation becomes grotesque when both alternatives of the choice are
... compromising. The hero has to play, even if there is no game. Every
move is bad, but he cannot throw down his cards. To throw down the cards
would also be a bad move."'" 3 This is the situation of the social human
being, yet it is the situation that deliberative democracy wishes to deny.
Deliberative democracy seeks to create in a life of dialogue a safe,
inviolable haven for the cultivation of personal and group identity; it seeks
a way for society to reap the benefits of politics without the risks. Such a
goal, alas, is unattainable. There is no safe haven, either for individuals or
minorities, from the transforming pressures of social life. You are always
in the game, even when you think you are out.
To admit this is not by any means to say that individuals have no power
to affect the course of events: the ideas that people introduce into the public
arena and the things they do there can greatly influence the nature of a
society's institutions and the ultimate shape of its collective identity. But
it is a mistake to think that a life of discourse is one that is somehow lived
off the public stage. On the contrary, to advocate a life of discourse is to
advocate transforming the public stage into an endless collective seminar
starring a cast of professors-a kind of permanent faculty meeting. If such
a spectacle were worth producing, then deliberative democracy might have
some merit, but it would surely prove impossibly dull and ultimately
unedifying.
It is far better to concede that because we must do something, we might
as well do the only thing we can do, given the constraints of human
knowledge and fallibility: we should do what seems to us best. That is what
Madisonian citizens try to do--their best. It is all anyone can do, and it is
therefore all that we can hope to strive for.
113. Jan Kott, King Lear or Endgame, in SHAKESPEARE OUR CONTEMPORARY 135
(1966).
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